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COMMENTS
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT-ASSET OR
LIABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION-NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
One of the banking industry's primary functions is to provide loans for
residential and commercial development. This role places enormous power
in the hands of lenders who decide, through the allocation of credit, which
areas of a community will receive funds for development. Clearly, develop-
ers and investors of all types will want to pursue attractive investment op-
portunities, but, ultimately, it is the banker's discretion which becomes
determinative of whether or not a loan will be made. The Community Re-
investment Act (CRA) provides that "regulated financial institutions are
required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the conven-
ience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do busi-
ness."2 Introduced by Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), this Act was
premised on the assumption that "a public charter conveys numerous eco-
nomic benefits and in return it is legitimate for public policy and regulatory
practice to require some public purpose ....
The CRA is brief and provides that regulators of publicly chartered fi-
nancial institutions: (1) use their authority to encourage institutions to meet
the credit needs of their local communities in a manner consistent with safe
and sound operation of such institutions;4 (2) assess the institution's record
of meeting the credit needs of its entire community;5 and (3) take the insti-
tution's record into account when evaluating applications for a deposit fa-
cility by such institution.6 Despite vehement objection to the CRA by
lenders who viewed it as a step towards credit allocation, the CRA was
passed in 1977.7
The CRA took a novel approach towards government regulation.
There were no strict detailed requirements. Rather, the CRA "established
1. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2906 (West 1989).
2. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a).
3. 123 CONG. REc. S406 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
4. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(b) (West 1989).
5. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903(1) (West 1989).
6. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903(2) (West 1989).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2906
(West 1989)).
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a direction and goal, and then allowed private industry latitude and discre-
tion in choosing methods to attain the goal."' The CRA also rejected the
extreme positions of credit allocation on the one hand and complete lack of
social responsibility on the other, while attempting to improve lending prac-
tices.9 "IT]he bill is described almost as a sensitizing tool intended to 'raise
the consciousness' of lenders and regulators, and gently lead them toward a
greater awareness of urban lending needs."' 0
From its inception in 1977, the CRA was not vigorously enforced nor
did it receive much attention." However, the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)'2 amended the
CRA and mandated public disclosure of CRA ratings with respect to exam-
inations conducted after July 1, 1990.13 Traditionally, bankers have not
been concerned about their CRA records, but the prospect of increased
public scrutiny is capturing their attention because penalties for noncompli-
ance now include public criticism and negative publicity.' 4
This Comment will evaluate the boundaries of the CRA itself, evaluate
the impact of the CRA on the banking industry, identify the role commu-
nity groups play in ensuring compliance, illustrate how the CRA can be an
asset to financial institutions, and suggest how lawmakers can improve the
CRA.
8. Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The Community Reinvest-
ment Act One Decade Late, 18 PAC. L.J. 1071, 1073 (1987).
9. See id.
10. WARREN L. DENNIS & J. STANLEY POTTINGER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING:
REDLINING AND COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 9-22 (1980).
11. Ken Martin, Putting Teeth in the CRA, AUSTIN Bus. J., July 30, 1990, at 1.
12. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.A. (West 1989)).
13. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 526, 528 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2902(2), 2906 (West 1989)). This amendment
affected the CRA in three ways. First, it required that regulators use a four-tier descriptive rating
system in place of the five-tier numerical system that was previously in use. Second, it required
that the regulatory agencies provide the institutions with a written evaluation of their CRA per-
formance. The written evaluation contains a confidential section and a public section that must
reveal the regulatory agency's findings and conclusions pertaining to each assessment factor of
their examination and an overall CRA rating. Third, it mandated public disclosure of the ratings
for examinations conducted after July 1, 1990. See id.
14. Jo Ann S. Barefoot, July 1 Nears. Is Your CRA Program Ready?; Public Disclosure of
Ratings is Only the Beginning, AM. BANKING ASS'N BANKING J., June 1990, at 43.
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II. THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
A. Purpose
The CRA was enacted as an attempt to discourage redlining. 5 Redlin-
ing, or geographic disinvestment, is the removal of financial resources from
a community that is perceived to be high risk.16 Anti-redlining advocates
claim that savings deposited by a neighborhood should remain in that
neighborhood.' 7 Outrage over institutions receiving millions of dollars in
deposits from residents of a community while making virtually no loans
into that community undoubtedly encouraged the passage of the CRA. 18
Redlining in this context refers to:
[A]ny institutional conduct that has a negative impact on an identifi-
able neighborhood or neighborhoods. This can include the failure to
take some affirmative step, (such as failing to seek out potential loan
demand) as well as the commission of some negative act (e.g., refus-
ing to lend on a particular street because of perceived risk).'9
Redlining is suspect when the perceived risk is unrealistic or arbitrary.20
Civil rights activists regard the refusal to make loans in a particular area
(redlining) solely because of deteriorating conditions as symptomatic of ra-
cism.2 Anti-redlining activists contend that locational factors penalize po-
tential customers for associational factors or characteristics of others that
are beyond their control.22 Geographic discrimination is problematic when
lenders generalize that all properties in a given area are unlikely to retain
their value and thus are poor collateral. When this occurs, lenders are un-
likely to regard the individual characteristics of a credit applicant as perti-
nent to their decision-making. Therefore, in areas subject to geographic
discrimination, loans are typically refused or offered on less favorable terms
than those offered in other parts of the community. Admittedly, location is
an important factor, but geographic discrimination surfaces when there is
15. The concept of redlining exists in two different contexts. First, in the political arena, the
term is used to inflame and provoke a discriminatory reaction. Second, in the legal arena, the
term is used to describe prohibited kinds of commercial conduct. DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra
note 10, at 1-1.
16. Art, supra note 8, at 1082.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 10, at 1-3.
20. Id. at 1-7.
21. James C. Granelli, Group Accuses American Savings of 'Redlining" L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3,
1991, (Bus.), at 2.
22. DENNIS & PO717INGER, supra note 10, at 1-3.
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an unrestrained use of location as the primary credit criteria. The result of
such a policy may be irrational, or more seriously, socially unacceptable.23
Consequently, the CRA was enacted with its stated purpose being to:
[R]equire each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to
use its authority when examining financial institutions, to encourage
such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communi-
ties in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound
operations of such institutions.24
The CRA is neither a traditional civil rights law nor a traditional bank-
ing regulation. It does not strictly prohibit any acts nor does it establish
civil penalties, damages, or injunctions. The Act is not enforced directly; it
is superimposed on the existing banking and savings and loan structures
and integrated into the existing system of regulation.25
While the CRA was generally aimed at the twin evils of geographic dis-
crimination and the exportation of funds from the local community, the
authors of the act had more specific goals in mind. The CRA's regulations
indicate that Congress's priorities were aimed at revitalizing inner cities
through residential mortgage loans, housing rehabilitation loans, home im-
provement loans, and small business or farm loans within the community.26
Although the CRA is often criticized for being so vague as to be mean-
ingless, critics overlook the significant impact the CRA has had on financial
institutions. In the words of one commentator:
The Act settled the core philosophical dispute over whether deposi-
tory institutions enjoying the benefits of federal charters and federal
deposit insurance owe any duty to consider the impact on neighbor-
hoods when determining [their] lending policies. The C.R.A. was a
legislative mandate for a change in policy and an unmistakable re-
buke to financial institutions and the federal supervisory agencies
that had previously sanctioned and even encouraged redlining.
27
23. Art, supra note 8, at 1080.
24. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(b) (West 1989). The four federal financing supervisory agencies are:
(1) the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates national banks; (2) the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve, which regulates state-chartered banks and bank holding companies; (3)
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which regulates the state chartered commercial and
savings banks it insures but does not regulate Federal Reserve System members; and (4) the Office
of Thrift Supervision, which regulates savings associations whose deposits are insured by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation and savings and loan holding companies. See 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 2902(l)(A)-(D) (West 1989).
25. DENNIS & POT-INGER, supra note 10, at 9-4.
26. Id. at 9-17.
27. Art, supra note 8, at 1086.
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B. Delineation of Community
A financial institution's first step in complying with the CRA is to delin-
eate the community it serves. The regulations mandate that a map be used
and that the delineated area may not exclude low or moderate income
neighborhoods. 28 The local community consists of the contiguous areas
surrounding each of the institution's offices.29 An unusually shaped com-
munity will generally create a suspicion among regulators that the institu-
tion is "gerrymandering." 30 Furthermore, regulatory agencies are given
broad discretion in determining the reasonableness of delineated
communities.31
The regulations provide specific methods for delineating a CRA com-
munity. First, an institution may use any existing political or governmental
boundaries, such as a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), to
identify the community it serves.32 A second method utilizes an institution's
effective lending territory. 33 The effective lending territory is defined as the
local area around each office in which the institution makes a substantial
portion of its loans and all areas equally distant from each of its offices.34
The third approach is to use any other reasonably delineated area that
meets the CRA's purpose and does not exclude low and moderate income
areas.35 Regardless of what method is used, the key to establishing a rea-
sonably delineated community is to not exclude low and moderate income
areas.36 Low and moderate income areas are defined as those census tracts
where the median family income is less than eighty percent of the median
family income for the SMSA.3 7
28. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(a) (1992). Each federal supervisory agency has its own set of regula-
tions. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.3-7 (1992) (Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 228.3-7 (1992)
(Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. § 345.3-7 (1992) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation);
12 C.F.R. § 563e3-7 (1992) (Office of Thrift Supervision). All of these regulations are virtually
identical. For convenience, subsequent footnotes will refer to the Office of Thrift Supervision's
regulations.
29. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b) (1992).
30. See 8 KENNETH M. LAPINE, BANKING LAW § 158.04[1] (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1987).
31. Id.
32. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)(1) (1992). If the size of the institution dictates a smaller deline-
ated area, it may adopt a fraction of the SMSA. Id. In fact, smaller institutions should carefully
delineate their communities because examiners will review their lending patterns throughout their
designated area. See LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[1].
33. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)(2) (1992).
34. Id.
35. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)(3) (1992).
36. See id
37. FEDERAL RESERVE Sys. COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, Pt. II, § 1.45 (1979).
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C. CRA Statement, Public File, and Public Notice
1. CRA Statement
Each regulated financial institution's board of directors is required to
adopt a CRA statement.38 The statement is similar to a general prospectus
regarding community lending commitments.39 The CRA statements must
contain: (1) the delineation of the local community; (2) a list of specific
types of credit available to the local community; and (3) a copy of the CRA
notice." The local community delineation must be determined according
to one of the permissible methods specified in the regulations. The CRA
statement must also contain a map of the local community to which the
CRA statement pertains.
41
In addition, the specific types of credit that the financial institution of-
fers within the community must be described in the CRA statement.42 For
example, the regulations suggest the following types of credit descriptions:
residential loans on one to four family dwellings, residential loans for five-
or-more unit dwellings, housing rehabilitation loans, home improvement
loans, commercial loans, and consumer loans. 43 The type of credit available
will vary depending on the nature of the financial institution.' For in-
stance, wholesale banks that do not offer consumer loans will not be re-
quired to offer such loans.4" Also, the amount of credit available for a
specific loan-type does not have to be disclosed.46
Regulators must determine whether the types of loans specified in the
institution's CRA statement are actually being offered-loans available only
under onerous terms may be viewed as the equivalent of not offering
credit.47 Within an institution's delineated area of service, the type of credit
should not vary.48 For example, real estate loans should not be readily
available in only one area unless the circumstances are particularly compel-
ling. 9 The same underwriting requirements should exist throughout the
38. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(a) (1992).
39. LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[2].
40. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(b)(l)-(3) (1992); see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text for
considerations implicit in delineating a local community.
41. LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[2].
42. Id.
43. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(b)(2) (1992).
44. LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[2].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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community." The CRA statement is required to include a copy of the
CRA notice as well."1
The CRA regulations encourage, but do not require, regulated financial
institutions to include the following information in their CRA statement:
(1) a description of how the institution's current programs are helping to
meet community credit needs; (2) a current report of the institution's record
of helping to meet community credit needs; and (3) a description of the
institution's efforts to determine the credit needs of the community, includ-
ing communications with members of the community with respect to credit
52services.
Although this information is optional, lenders should include this infor-
mation because these factors are taken into consideration when regulators
assess an institution's CRA performance. 53 Furthermore, if the institution
provides thorough documentation regarding these factors, it will decrease
the amount of regulatory probing necessary to reconstruct this information
during an examination.54
The board of directors of a regulated institution is required to annually
review its CRA statement and amend the statement whenever there is a
material change in policy.5  Consideration regarding the CRA statement
must be noted in the minutes of the board's meeting. 6 For example, a
change in the availability of real estate financing may require a CRA state-
ment modification. 7 This type of change, as well as any board of director's
discussion, must be included in the minutes. 8
The regulations also require that the CRA statement be available to the
public for inspection at the main office of the financial institution and at
each branch office in the delineated community. 9 In addition to the availa-
bility of the CRA statement for inspection, regulated financial institutions
must provide photocopies of the statement to the public upon request." A
fee not exceeding the cost of reproduction may be imposed.6
50. Id.
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(b)(3) (1992).
52. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(c)(1)-(3) (1992).
53. See LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[2].
54. Id.
55. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(d) (1992).
56. Id
57. See LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[2].
58. Id.
59. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(e)(1)-(2) (1992).
60. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(f) (1992).
61. Id.
19921
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2. Public File
Each regulated financial institution must maintain a CRA file readily
available to the public for inspection.62 The files are required to contain the
following: (1) any signed, written comments the institution received from
the public within the last two years that specifically relates to the institu-
tion's performance in meeting the credit needs of its community; (2) any
institutional response to the comments received; and (3) any CRA state-
ments in effect during the past two years.6 3 The CRA files may not include
any comments or responses that adversely reflect upon the reputation or
good name of any individual other than the institution.' Additionally, any
information that would violate specific provisions of the law cannot be
made public.65 The CRA files must be available at the institution's main
office and at designated branch offices in each of the local communities
served.66
3. Public Notice
Each regulated institution is required to post a CRA notice in the public
lobby of each of its branches or offices. 67 Institutions serving multiple com-
munities must provide additional information applicable to each specific
community.68 The text of the CRA notice is incorporated in the
regulations.69
D. Assessment of CRA Performance
The formal requirements of the CRA regulations, such as maintaining
the public file, posting the CRA notice, drafting the CRA statement, and
delineating of the local community, provide the framework by which finan-
cial regulatory agencies will assess a financial institution's CRA perform-
62. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.5(a) (1992).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.5(a)(1), (3)-(4) (1992).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.5(b) (1992).
65. Id.
66. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.5(c)(1)-(2) (1992).
67. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.6(a) (1992).
68. See LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[2].
69. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.6 (1992) (Community Reinvestment Act Notice). Essentially, the
CRA notice states that the appropriate regulatory agency will evaluate the institution's perform-
ance in helping to meet community credit needs when deciding to approve applications for busi-
ness expansion and that community involvement in making this evaluation is encouraged. The
notice alerts the customer that there is a public file that they are free to examine. Further, the
notice informs the public of its right to obtain the institution's CRA statement and to comment on
the institution's performance in meeting local credit needs. Id.
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ance. 70 The Act empowers regulatory agencies to promulgate regulations 71
that will aid them in determining whether financial institutions have: (1)
demonstrated that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of
their communities and (2) whether they are continuing to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered.72
The regulations for assessing a financial institution's CRA performance
provide that the requirement of helping to meet community credit needs be
consistent with the safe and sound operation of that institution.73 The CRA
does not impose many procedural obligations or strict recordkeeping re-
quirements.74 However, regulators' enforcement practices indicate that
special records should be kept to record an institution's performance.7s
Thus, most lenders engage in additional recordkeeping as a defensive mea-
sure.76 It is important to note that when a financial institution's community
includes both low and moderate income areas, the CRA does not mandate
that each be served equally with mathematical precision. An area within
the community may simply not offer qualified lending opportunities. The
CRA does not attempt to fix amounts of lending in particular areas (credit
allocation) nor does it mandate that every loan application be approved.77
In addition to the CRA statement and any signed, written comments,
the regulations provide twelve areas of consideration that regulators are to
utilize in assessing an institution's CRA performance. 78 In an attempt to
make the assessment factors more workable, the American Bankers Associ-
ation has classified these twelve assessment factors into five broader catego-
ries to help institutions more thoroughly implement the Act's
requirements.79
The first category assesses an institution's activities regarding efforts to
ascertain the credit needs of its community.8" Regulators will look for con-
tact with individuals, groups, government officials, and community lead-
70. LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[3].
71. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901, 2905 (West 1989).
72. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a)(1), (3) (West 1989) (emphasis added). A community's conven-
ience and needs include the need for credit services as well as deposit services. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 2901(a)(2).
73. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(b) (West 1989); see also 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7.
74. See generally LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[4] & n.2.
75. Id. at § 158.04[4].
76. Id.; see also DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 10, at 9-24.
77. DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 10, at 9-42.
78. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(a)(1) (1992).
79. AMERICAN BANKERS AWS'N, CRA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR COMMUNITY BANK
CEO'S 27-29 (1990).
80. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(a) (1992).
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ers.8 ' Further, regulators will search for evidence of participation in public
programs, relationships with nonprofit developers, and the collection and
analysis of local demographic data reflecting loan activity. 2 In addition,
examiners will scrutinize the participation of the institution's board of di-
rectors in formulating and reviewing the CRA statement and related
policies.83
The second category assesses marketing programs and the types of
credit extended.84 In this category, regulators evaluate the extent of mar-
keting of services and the availability of "special credit-related programs"
to low and moderate income individuals,85 the "origination" or "purchase"
of community loans,86 and the level of "participation in government in-
sured, guaranteed, or subsidized loan programs."87
The third group of assessment factors is used to analyze the institution's
geographic distribution of loans88 and its record of opening and closing of-
fices.8 9 These factors include the extension of credit, the number of credit
applications, and the number of denials geographically. 90 Examiners look
at the geographic distributions of loans within the delineated community,
the procedures used to identify credit distribution, and the supporting docu-
mentation of credit extensions used by management to formulate policies
and create products, services, and marketing strategies.91 In addition, ac-
tion taken to remedy past lending previously judged unreasonable and the
impact of the institution's loan policies on the local community are
considered.92
An institution's record of opening and closing branch offices and the
services they provide is also scrutinized.93 In analyzing this assessment fac-
tor, regulators determine the institution's accessibility by considering busi-
81. See generally LAPINE, supra note 30, at § 158.04[4].
82. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 79, at 27.
83. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(c) (1992).
84. Regulators who examine an institution's marketing efforts consider advertisements of
available credit services, personnel involvement in marketing and assisting in the application pro-
cess for loans within the institution's delineated community, the CRA's statement of credit-types
available, and the institution's loan volume relative to their resources and community needs. See
AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 79, at 27-28.
85. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(b) (1992).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(i) (1992).
87. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(j) (1992).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(e) (1992).
89. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(g) (1992).
90. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(e) (1992).
91. See AMERICAN BANKER AWS'N, supra note 79, at 27.
92. Id.
93. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(g) (1992).
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ness hours and services offered. 9a Finally, regulators examine to what
extent the institution has assessed the impact of an office closing and its
record of opening and closing branches, particularly in low and moderate
income areas.95
Discrimination and illegal credit practices comprise the fourth area reg-
ulators investigate during a CRA review.96 Any practice intended to dis-
courage applications for the types of credit set out in the CRA statement
will not be tolerated.97 To determine whether these practices occur, exam-
iners study the manner in which an institution solicits credit applicants
throughout the community.98 Further, management policies, procedures,
and training programs designed to prevent the discouragement and pre-
screening of applicants are examined.9 9 Any evidence of noncompliance
with antidiscrimination credit laws or of other illegal credit practices will
adversely affect an institution's CRA performance."°
Community development is the final category regulators consider. 10 1
Participation in local investment and development projects0 2 and the abil-
ity of an institution to meet local community credit needs based on its finan-
cial condition and size 03 are taken into consideration. The last factor is a
catch-all intended to allow regulators to consider any other activities
targeted at helping the institution meet community credit needs."°
E. Effect on Applications
Under the CRA, each regulated institution has an affirmative obligation
to help meet the credit needs of its local community.' Under the current
structure of the CRA, financial institutions must demonstrate that they are
currently serving the "convenience and needs"' 06 of the community when
applying to their regulatory agency for permission to change their struc-
ture.10 7 The regulatory agency's enforcement tool under the CRA is the
94. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 79, at 29.
95. Id. at 28-29.
96. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(f) (1992).
97. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(d) (1992).
98. AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 79, at 29.
99. Id.
100. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(f) (1992).
101. AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 79, at 29.
102. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(h) (1992).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(k) (1992).
104. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(1) (1992).
105. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a)(3) (West 1989).
106. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a)(1) (West 1989).
107. DENNIS & POTTINGER, supra note 10, at 9-5. Changes in a financial institution's struc-
ture that require regulatory approval include a charter for a national bank or federal savings and
1992]
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power to deny an institution's application to change its structure or to con-
dition such approval upon development of a plan to ascertain and meet
future needs. 0 8
CRA examinations are conducted at regularly scheduled intervals and
when an application for structural change is made.l°" Regular CRA exami-
nations have not been given "teeth" in situations where the examiner deter-
mines that an institution has acted in a manner inconsistent with the CRA.
The examiner can do little more than include the inconsistency in the
"write-up" to be "taken into account" if and when an application is filed." 0
In the words of one commentator:
After a decade of experience with administration of the Act, it is safe
to say that poor C.R.A. performance will not result in denial of an
application except in the most extreme, egregious cases, and perhaps
not even then. The number of denials on C.R.A. grounds is minis-
cule .... Other factors, however, cumulatively provide substantial
incentives to depository institutions. Principal among those factors
are delay in processing the application, adverse publicity, and
embarrassment. "'
III. THE CRA REPRESENTS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE
BANKING INDUSTRY
A. Traditional View
Prior to the enactment of the CRA in 1977, it appeared that the banking
industry rejected the notion that a financial institution had a responsibility
to affirmatively contribute to the economic health of the low and moderate
income neighborhoods that they served." 2 Further, federal regulatory
agencies supported and encouraged the bankers' view that financial safety
and profitability were the only acceptable goals, regardless of the adverse
effects on surrounding communities." f3 Today, more than thirteen years
loan association, the granting of deposit insurance to a newly chartered bank, the establishment of
a branch or other deposit-accepting facility, the relocation of the home or branch office, the
merger or acquisition of a commercial bank or savings association that requires regulatory ap-
proval, and acquisitions covered by the Bank Holding Company Act or National Housing Act.
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2902(3)(A)-(F) (West 1989).
108. DENNIS & PO=rINGER, supra note 10, at 9-4.
109. Id. at 9-5.
110. Id. at 9-7.
111. Art, supra note 8, at 1101. Of 628 banks rated nationwide, only 68 have been given a
"needs to improve" rating and only three have failed. Mike Doming, Minorities Hope Loan Rules
Pack Teeth, Not Paperwork, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1990, (Bus.), at Cl.
112. Art, supra note 8, at 1072.
113. Id.
[Vol. 75:599
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
after the CRA was passed, bankers still voice complaints that they should
not be mandated to lose money through, what they call, social
engineering. 1
4
The view that banking was an entrepreneurial business fostered the be-
lief that the only justifiable limitations on banking were those of "safe and
sound" practices.115 Previously, the purpose of government regulation was
to protect the funds of depositors and shareholders.116 The public was
served through the benefits afforded by the presence of financial in-
termediaries in the economy.117 Nevertheless, banking law, since the De-
pression, has principally targeted early detection and prevention of unsafe
banking practices. 18
B. Modern View
Throughout the 1970s, Congress took a broader view of the role of fi-
nancial institutions in the economy and enacted numerous laws that ex-
panded their obligation beyond mere safe and sound operation.1 19
Consequently, the CRA resulted from Congress's new perspective on the
role of financial institutions.12 Today, enhanced CRA enforcement has oc-
curred at the same time that there has been a change in American values.21
James Valliere explained this change in the following way:
Just as bank deregulation in the early 1980s was coincident with an
anti-tax, anti-federal regulation movement, so too we now find that
CRA enforcement meshes with a broad trend in which society sees a
need to have pressing social issues addressed by banks .... Themes
such as affordable housing, lending to minority-owned businesses,
and simply providing credit to the communities that banks serve, are
now viewed as elemental demands on banks.' 22
Critics of the CRA classify it as a form of credit allocation and, as such,
view it as intolerable in our capitalistic society. However, given the vital
114. Chuck Hawkins et al., Why More Banks May Start Doing the Right Thing, Bus. WK.,
June 18, 1990, at 171.
115. Warren L. Dennis, The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977- Defining "Convenience
and Needs of the Community" 95 BANKING L.J. 693, 694-95 (1978).
116. IM. at 694.
117. Id. at 695.
118. Id
119. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608 (1988) (Fair Housing Act of 1968); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667
(1988) (Truth in Lending Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 12
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1988) (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act).
120. Dennis, supra note 115, at 696.
121. James T. Valliere, CRA Marks Basic Change in Nation's Social Values, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 13, 1990, at 4.
122. Id
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economic role that financial institutions play in our economy, the federal
government's regulatory influence on private credit decisions is supported
by precedent. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act 2 3 established the savings
and loan system for the purpose of providing residential real estate loans
within a restricted geographic radius of the institution's office.124 Further
examples of federal government credit allocation include secondary market
agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac).12
These associations were established to divert dollars to finance real estate
mortgages that would otherwise be invested elsewhere.126 The Federal
Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration are additional
organizations created to channel funds into real estate financing that is con-
sidered socially desirable.127 Although there is some debate as to which
federal government efforts constitute "credit allocation," governmental in-
fluence over private credit decisions as introduced in the CRA was not a
novel concept. 128 Such "influence" originated many decades earlier. 129
Bankers correctly view themselves as having a bottom-line mentality, 130
which they admit sometimes causes them to lose sight of the needs of their
communities. However, this view is changing among bankers who now per-
ceive that financial institutions have a responsibility to their communi-
ties.1 3 ' The relatively new provision mandating public disclosure of CRA
ratings 132 provides a business incentive for bankers to change both their
attitudes and their lending patterns in order to comply with the CRA provi-
sions. A negative CRA evaluation will have costs. With ratings being
made public, banks are concerned that big depositors, such as government
entities, may pull their funds from institutions receiving poor evalua-
tions.133 Further, applications for expansion can be denied or delayed if the
institution has a poor rating. 134
123. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1421-1449 (West 1988).
124. Art, supra note 8, at 1084.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1085.
129. Id.
130. Tom Howard, Lending Law: Legislation Makes Sure Lending Institutions Don't Ignore
the Needs of Minorities, Low-Income Residents, BILLINGS GAzETrE, Aug. 26, 1990, at D1.
131. Id.
132. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2906(b)(2) (West 1989).
133. Hawkins et al., supra note 114, at 171.
134. Id.
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The CRA does not require credit allocation. Rather, it serves to empha-
size that regulated financial institutions have an obligation to serve the con-
venience and needs of their communities including low and moderate
income neighborhoods.135
The underlying issue is the balance between a financial institution's re-
sponsibility to its communities and its very business of lending money for a
return, with the attendant responsibility to shareholders.136 The balance is
weighted further by congressional demands and the mandates of the
regulators. 137
IV. ROLE OF COMMUNITY GROUPS
The C.R.A. was a compromise between the demands of community
groups for rigid credit allocation and the denial by bankers and reg-
ulators that any problem meriting legislative attention existed.
More importantly, it was an effort to guide private investment deci-
sions in a manner deemed socially responsible, while avoiding the
economic inefficiencies and bureaucratic intrusiveness of some fed-
eral regulatory schemes. Congress sought to preserve private con-
trol over specific private institutional lending decisions, but to
influence the attitudes, norms, and behavior of the decision
makers. 138
The success or failure of the CRA currently rests in the hands of com-
munity groups. The energy, activism, and sophistication of these groups
can affect the conduct of financial institutions and the amount of attention
regulators focus on lenders.139 The CRA has enhanced the bargaining posi-
tion of community groups because concern over CRA lending has brought
these groups off the streets and into the conference rooms of regulated insti-
tutions and regulatory agencies." The bargaining position of community
groups is greatest when a depository institution's application for expansion
is up for review.11 Although financial institutions are most vulnerable to a
community group's demands for more credit while an application is pend-
ing, institutions should always be responsive to community activists to ad-
135. Raija H. Bettauer, Federal and State Anti-Redlining Laws: Must National Banks Com-
ply With Both?, 97 BANKING L.J. 329, 335 (1980).
136. Judith Schonbak, Caught in the Middle: Atlanta's Banks are Still Struggling Over Low-
Income Lending Practices, Bus. ATLANTA, Aug. 1990, § 1, at 42.
137. Id.
138. Art, supra note 8, at 1085.
139. Id. at 1095.
140. Id. at 1097.
141. Id.
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dress credit policy issues. 142 Bankers who fail to establish communication
with community groups place their CRA ratings in jeopardy 143 and in-
crease the probability of future challenges to applications. Formal protests
to an institution's application for expansion, as well as the bank's own fail-
ure to communicate with the community, can be extremely costly both in
terms of unnecessary delays and negative publicity."4
To raise concerns over an institution's CRA performance and challenge
its application to expand, community groups have two formal options.
They may file negative comments with the appropriate regulatory agency,
adding them to the targeted institution's public file, or they can file a pro-
test. 14 Negative comments will eventually reach the attention of regulators
and may cause some special inquiry, while protests almost always will elicit
an agency response.146
The effectiveness of a community group's protest depends on the level of
expertise they develop in documenting alleged CRA violations and their
persistence in negotiating for loan commitments within their community. 47
Regulatory agencies place little weight on insufficiently documented com-
plaints and encourage community groups to negotiate rather than seek reg-
ulatory action for their grievances.14 8 Thus, protests have frequently
become the driving force of nonregulatory action. Community groups are
able to use protests to force financial institutions to the bargaining table. 49
Consequently, lending agreements may be established under the threat of a
costly protest. 150
The purpose of CRA evaluations is to provide a mechanism that en-
courages dialogue between financial institutions and their communities re-
garding the best method to meet community credit needs.' 5 ' Federal
Reserve Governor John P. LaWare contends that community groups
should play an active role in educating the public so it understands that
CRA evaluations assess community reinvestment performance and not the
142. Id.
143. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(a) (1992).
144. Art, supra note 8, at 1097-98.
145. DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 10, at 10-4.
146. Id.
147. Art, supra note 8, at 1098.
148. Id.
149. DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 10, at 10-4.
150. Id.
151. Representative Dorgan Says Administration Must Say Who Will Pay for S & L Depositor
Bailout, 55 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1023 (Dec. 24, 1990).
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safety and soundness of a financial institution.15 2 Because community
groups have the biggest stake in creating CRA support, these groups must
work at illustrating and emphasizing the economic advantages of commu-
nity lending.s 3
V. CRA AS AN ASSET
The CRA and proponents for even stricter community lending stan-
dards argue that CRA lending should not be viewed as a losing proposi-
tion. 54 While profits from CRA lending may not be extraordinary, its
return on investment is far more attractive than many Third World
loans.155 CRA supporters contend that if "Black America" was a Third
World country, lending institutions would pour dollars into impoverished
communities.1 56 They argue that the black community has a $200 billion
annual cash flow, millions of well-educated and skilled citizens, and solid
credit-worthy businesses. 57 Inner cities and poor rural and small town
communities are effectively Third World economies that have the same de-
velopment banking needs as any other distressed economy. 15  Unfortu-
nately, the CRA is the only attempt to define such a role for lenders within
the United States.1 59
A fundamental flaw of regulated financial institutions is that they have
responded to the CRA with a crisis-management approach to compli-
ance. 1 ° Apparently, many institutions view CRA activity and corporate
social responsibility as submerging safety and soundness concerns. 161 This
belief is unfounded because the CRA stipulates that financial institutions
"must not violate safety and soundness principles" in order to meet the
152. Id. The above are Federal Reserve Governor John P. LaWare's comments to the Con-
sumer Federation of America. He also stated that the CRA was not a charitable program and it is
not in any group's interest to foster this view. Id
153. Id
154. Hawkins et al., supra note 114, at 171. The article cites Wells Fargo Bank, which has
yet to have a default on $137 million in CRA housing loans since 1986, and the profitability of
Cleveland's Ameritrust Development Bank, which is committed exclusively to local development
projects. Id
155. Daud M. Watts, Unlocking the Potential of the CRA, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 1989, at
21. In drawing the analogy comparing inner cities to Third World countries, the author quoted
Dr. Charles Bradford, a Hoover Institute Fellow, who testified at Senate hearings in March 1987.
See id
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Ruth H. Scott, Making CRA an Asset (Or a Limited Liability), BOTrOMLINE, Mar.
1989, at 95.
161. Id
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credit needs of their communities.' 62 Financial institutions fear poor CRA
ratings because of their potentially devastating effects.
Whether because of altruism, fear of negative publicity, or the threat of
denial of regulatory applications due to poor performance, banks are paying
careful attention to CRA compliance.' 63 Many institutions are being crea-
tive and generous in their quest for positive evaluations. 164 It is in the best
interests of financial institutions to make these kind of activities known. 165
Institutions profiting under the CRA have developed, and are continuing to
develop creative ways to market their community investment activities,
while reducing risk and gaining status within their communities. 166
For example, financial institutions may provide small business loans and
at the same time protect that investment by providing training in bookkeep-
ing, marketing, and inventory control for applicants.167 Joint ventures with
the government and private investors designed to enhance low-income
housing markets provide another risk-reducing mechanism that financial
institutions can apply to CRA loans.1 68 Another possible strategy is to offer
a special savings account to customers who wish to make a socially con-
scious investment.1 69 The account would pay a low interest rate enabling
the bank to extend credit within the community at lower than market-rate
interest.170 A financial institution's commitment to the economic develop-
ment of the communities it serves makes good business sense. Deposits are
likely to increase if the community has the ability to access credit for eco-
nomic development. Those banks that take the lead stand to gain the
most. 171
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE CRA
The CRA and the regulatory agencies' corresponding regulations are
framed so broadly that they provide little guidance for institutions on how
compliance will be measured.172 The vague and undemanding nature of the
regulations may induce a false sense of security that may have serious con-
162. Id. at 96; see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(b) (West 1989).
163. Warren W. Traiger, Advertising CRA Programs Can Build Public Support, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 17, 1990, at 4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Scott, supra note 160, at 95-96.
167. Id. at 95.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 96.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 95.
172. 75 FED. RES. BULL. 619 (Sept. 1989).
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sequences to a naive lender. 7 ' "Some question arises as to whether this is
truly a system of 'voluntary' gestures, or whether it is a game of regulatory
hide and seek, or regulation by telepathy."' 74  Nonetheless, there are ex-
pectations under the CRA that may not be clearly expressed but which
institutions must be aware of and plan for.17 The vagueness of the CRA
and its regulations can work to the advantage of lenders who are forced to
defend their lending record. However, regulators are constantly attempting
to tighten the regulatory language and direct lending institutions towards a
more thorough understanding of the CRA. 17 6
A potential pitfall for lenders is not recognizing the difference between
"process" and "bottom line" in CRA evaluations, the two being inversely
related. The better the "bottom line" (the level of low and moderate in-
come lending), the less concern for "process" (the procedural require-
ments). The less substantial the "bottom line," the more an institution
must convince regulators that it has complied with all of the CRA assess-
ment factors. Essentially, the CRA requires a good faith effort that should
in turn result in a good "bottom line," but in the event it does not, the CRA
contains a safety valve. Lenders are not penalized for a poor "bottom line"
if they have complied with the CRA's procedural requirements.177
An express prohibition of redlining would be an improvement to the
CRA. As one commentator noted:
173. DENNIS & POTINGER, supra note 10, at 9-12.
174. Id The CRA provides a threefold mandate to regulatory agencies: "(1) to encourage
banks to help meet the credit needs of their entire communities, including low-and moderate-
income areas, (2) to assess their records during examinations, and (3) to take their records of
service under the CRA into account when evaluating proposals for expansion." 75 FED. RES.
BULL. 619. Bankers and regulators alike are trying to determine when and to what extent the
power of encouragement is appropriately applied.
175. 75 FED. RES. BULL. 619; see also supra notes 28-111 and accompanying text.
176. See Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
Reinvestment Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742 (Apr. 5, 1989). In their 1989 policy statement, the four
regulatory agencies indicated that, based on their experience, institutions that are most effective in
meeting their CRA responsibilities have taken many of the following measures:
(I) implemented more flexible lending policies consistent with safe and sound operation in
order to provide more widespread services to low-and moderate-income individuals;
(2) advertised and marketed availability of services through many mediums (television,
radio, and newspapers);
(3) established a process that includes contact by all levels of management with commu-
nity-related organizations to discuss needed financial services;
(4) extended credit to non-profit developers of low-income housing.
These are just a few of the many steps taken on behalf of institutions that have met their CRA
responsibilities. Id at 13,744.
177. DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 10, at 9-12 to 9-13.
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Although the Community Reinvestment Act is an attempt to restrict
redlining practices, it fails to establish a comprehensive legislative
scheme for remedying such abuses. While the legislative history
clearly indicates that Congress was concerned with redlining,
neither the Act nor the regulations specifically address this issue or
declare such practice illegal. Rather, the Act and the regulations
merely stress the affirmative obligation of lending institutions to ser-
vice their local areas. 178
Under the existing regulatory scheme, the CRA assessment is only one as-
pect of reviewing an institution's application for expansion. Financial,
managerial, and competitive concerns are considered as well.17 9 The im-
portance of the CRA could be enhanced if an adverse CRA rating alone
could prevent approval of an application for expansion.
Another problem is exemplified by institutions that have no intent to
expand and may never apply to their regulatory agency for such permission.
The sanction of noncompliance-the denial of an application to expand-
becomes meaningless. These institutions have no incentive to comply with
the CRA. Consequently, lenders should be subject to both private and pub-
lic lawsuits under the CRA.' s° Private and public actions would help to
establish and to refine precedent as a guide to interpreting the CRA.
In an attempt to aid the regulated institutions' understanding of the
CRA, the four regulatory agencies issued a new policy statement in 1989
stating that:
A major thrust of the policy statement is to shift the "CRA spot-
light" away from the applications process .... We think that the
expanded CRA statement is an ideal vehicle for doing that by focus-
ing the attention of an institution's management, and of the public at
large, on the institution's record on an ongoing basis. ... "
178. Anne Marie Regan, The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: Another Attempt to
Control Redlining, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 635, 656 (1979). A similar viewpoint was expressed in
the following terms:
The problem is that the Act fails to specify particular practices that are prohibited or
required. Even the most discriminatory policy is not made an automatic ground for re-
jecting an application; it is simply one factor to be taken into account in the evaluation.
Therefore, the first national redlining law to go beyond mere disclosure does not even
purport to prohibit redlining.
Michael B. Tolcott, Legislating Against Mortgage Redlining: The Need for a Firmer Commitment
12 RUTGERS L.J. 151, 170 (1980).
179. 75 FED. RES. BULL. 550, 554 (Aug. 1989).
180. "Such remedies are needed because the single existing sanction of denying permits for
structural change may be unimpressive to many institutions; for an institution that has already
achieved its desired structure it is no deterrent at all." Tolcott, supra note 178, at 180.
181. 75 FED. RES. BULL. 550, 554.
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The policy statement also urges institutions that plan on expanding to have
appropriate CRA policies in place, and working well, before filing an appli-
cation."1 2 This suggestion is in response to the highly publicized and rare
CRA-based denial of Continental Illinois Bancorp Inc.'s application to ac-
quire an Arizona bank.183 In the past, the probability of a denial has been
remote, 8 4 but now the Continental decision may be viewed as a precursor
to regulators' increased expectations of compliance. However, two of the
Federal Reserve's Board of Governors dissented in the decision to deny the
application to expand in spite of Continental's total disregard for all of the
CRA's procedural requirements."8 5 The Continental application suggests
that there was blatant disregard for the CRA, yet two Governors still
thought that the bank's application merited approval.' 8 6 This outcome
raises serious doubts about the impact of this case and, consequently, the
prescribed sanctions under the CRA do not appear to be a sufficient threat
to an institution's plans for expansion.
VII. CRA AT WORK
A. Alarming Statistics
Nationally, African-American loan applicants are rejected twice as
often as white applicants. 8 Although the Federal Reserve Board's study
that produced this conclusion did not take into account applicants' credit
histories and their existing debt, the fact remains that African Americans
do not enjoy the same access to credit as whites.'88 The mortgage gap be-
tween African Americans and whites is alarming because home ownership
is a principal method of increasing wealth in the United States. Conse-
quently, barriers to home ownership as well as to funds for commercial
development only serve to prevent upward economic mobility for African
Americans.
182. Id.
183. 75 FED. REs. BULL. 304 (Apr. 1989).
184. Of 628 banks rated nationwide, just 3 failed and 68 received a "needs to improve" rating.
Doming, supra note 111, at Cl.
185. 75 FED. Rns. BULL. 304.
186. Id. at 305-06.
187. Paulette Thomas, Behind the Figures, Federal Data Detail Pervasive Racial Gap in Mort-
gage Lending, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1992, at Al. The Wall Street Journal critically analyzed the
Federal Reserve Board's recent release of data based on 1990 data. The Federal Reserve Board's
figures indicate that of 6.3 million mortgage applications at 9,300 financial institutions, African
American applicants were rejected 34% of the time while only 14% of white mortgage applica-
tions were rejected. Id.
188. Id (conclusion drawn by Donald Shackelford (President, State Savings Bank, Colum-
bus, Ohio)).
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Lenders explain that the mortgage gap exists for a variety of reasons.
For instance, the median income of African Americans is approximately
one-half of that of whites, which translates into a lower likelihood that Afri-
can Americans will have the funds for a down payment.1i 9 In addition,
lower-income individuals tend to change jobs more frequently for margin-
ally higher wages. 190 Lenders perceive these frequent job changes as evi-
dence of instability. 191 Furthermore, lower-income individuals are not as
likely to have credit cards or any other source to develop a solid credit
history.' 92 Perhaps the most alarming reason lenders cite for the mortgage
gap is the standards of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).193
These two entities have tremendous influence over the underwriting stan-
dards of home mortgage loans because they are the principal purchasers of
mortgages. Financial institutions often sell the mortgages that they origi-
nate to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in order to generate more funds for
future loans. If the lending institution fails to comply with the established
underwriting standards, it will be unable to bundle the particular loan with
others for sale. Consequently, the loan will not be extended.' 94
In an effort to dispel the belief that low-income lending is not profitable,
community groups are pre-screening potential low-income loan applicants
and counseling those who may not qualify for a loan. 195 Pre-screening loan
applicants not only saves lenders administrative costs in processing loan
applications, it assists lenders in making more profitable loans.' 96 In Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin, counseling agencies are growing with the assistance of
government commitment. The Home Buyer Counseling Task Force, cre-
ated in 1991 by Mayor John Norquist, instituted a fee-for-service system
189. Id. at A10.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. According to the Wall Street Journal, Fannie Mae purchased only 2.5% of its loans
from neighborhoods comprised of 80% or more minorities. Since most financial institutions resell
the mortgages they originate to either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, these entities set mortgage
underwriting standards. Until 1991, Fannie Mae would not purchase loans for less than $25,000.
While many low-income neighborhoods contained properties priced below this cut-off, bankers
would systematically deny these loans because they were too small to sell. Mortgage size and
neighborhood vacancy rates are often-cited criteria which take many lower-income individuals out
of the mortgage market.
194. Id. at AlO.
195. Id. at A11.
196. Id. The article makes reference to the success some financial institutions have had with
pre-screened loans. At one institution, only one of 175 pre-screened loans was 30 days past due.
At another institution, the portfolio of pre-screened mortgages outperformed the rest of their
portfolio of loans. Id.
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whereby lenders pay counseling agencies based on the number of loans the
lenders originate. 197
In Milwaukee, African Americans are four times as likely to be rejected
when applying for mortgage loans than whites. 198 Furthermore, minorities
whose incomes were 120% or more of the area's median income were re-
jected 18% of the time while poorer whites whose incomes were between
80-99% of the area's median income were turned away only 7.1% of the
time.199 In 1980, the income of African Americans in Milwaukee was ap-
proximately 70% that of whites' compared to the 63% national average, yet
forty-nine other cities' African American rejection rates were lower.2°°
This statistical disparity illustrates that a racial gap exists in the mortgage
lending market.201 Minority census tracts (census tracts which contain over
50% minority households) comprise 22% of Milwaukee's households but
receive approximately 8% of the loans.20 2
Milwaukee has targeted a core of eighty-one census tracts in the central
city in an attempt to spark community lending.203 However, the most re-
cently released figures indicate that lending in the target area is declining. 2 4
The area includes approximately 13.5% of the four-county area's house-
holds.205 In 1988, the target area received 4.8% of all mortgage and home
improvement loans and in 1989, 4.3% of loans were made in the target
area.206 The 1990 figures revealed that the target area received only 3.7%
197. Geoff Cooper, Counseling Gains as Central-City Lending Grows, Bus. J., Mar. 2, 1992,
at 6.
198. Geoff Cooper, Lenders Reject City's Blacks, Bus. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at 1. The figures that
were reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act reveal that 6.5% of whites in the four-
county Milwaukee Metropolitan area were rejected while African Americans were rejected 25%
of the time. Id. at 38.
199. d "The Milwaukee segment of the study considers more than 22,000 home-related
loans, totaling $1.4 billion, that were underwritten last year in a four-county area. Of those
22,000 loans, 87.7% went to whites and 12.3% went to nonwhites or mixed-race couples." Id.
200. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CIY OF MILWAUKEE, REVIEW OF RESIDENTIAL
LENDING PRACTICES OF LOCAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 11 (1989). This report references an
article appearing in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution on January 22, 1989, which revealed that
Milwaukee African Americans were rejected at the highest rate in their fifty-city survey. Id. at 1.
201. Id. at 2. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Professor Gregory Squires and Paul Adam-
ski, Deputy Commissioner of the State Office of the Commissioner of Savings & Loan, collected
and analyzed this data. Professor Squires and Mr. Adamski are members of the Fair Lending
Project, which is a coalition of various community residents aimed at improving central-city
lending.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Geoff Cooper, Dollar Drought Deepens in Central City, Bus. J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 1.
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id. at 38.
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of the loans and only 1.9% of the actual funds.2 °7 Another related statistic
in a recent study revealed "that neighborhoods that are primarily white
have seven times as many offices per person as neighborhoods that are pri-
marily [African American]."2 °8
The Fair Lending Project, a consortium of local community leaders, has
taken aim at Milwaukee lenders to assure CRA compliance. As of Septem-
ber 1991, it has secured pledges totaling $32 million from banks and thrifts
towards central city loans.2" 9 Lenders fear community groups, like the Fair
Lending Project, because they do not have any political or financial ties to
the banking industry. These groups are referred to as "loose cannons,"
which allow them to command respect from banks and thrifts at the negoti-
ating table.210
Banks are now approaching community groups before going to their
supervisory banking agency to apply for merger approval. The goal of fi-
nancial institutions is to avoid a community group's protests as well as
costly delays in the merger application process. 21' The respect lenders are
showing to community groups is directly tied to the CRA. Without a law
requiring lenders to address the credit needs of low-income areas, lenders
would not be as willing to negotiate investment strategy with community
groups.212
High rejection rates of African-American mortgage applicants in Bos-
ton has motivated thoughtful assessment of the causes. One study of the
disparity that exists in Boston has attempted to explain the systematic de-
207. Id. The study revealed that in 1990, 32% of applications from within the target area
were rejected as compared to the four-county 7.87% rejection rate. In addition, 22% of the resi-
dential loans were to non-occupants. Id. at 1.
208. Jack Norman, Black Areas in County Short of Lenders, Survey Shows, MILWAUKEE J.,
Apr. 5, 1992, at D1. The precise figures relied upon in the Milwaukee Journal article revealed the
following:
Neighborhood No. of bank offices
demographic per 100,000 people
90% white 35.3
10%-90% minority 17.6
90% minority 5.2
See Geoff Cooper, Lenders Say They Go Where the Growth Is, and Report Proves It, Bus. J., Apr.
6, 1992, at 7 (source of figures in table is the Fair Lending Project).
209. Geoff Cooper, A Pitbull for Milwaukee's Central City, Bus. J., Sept. 23, 1991, at 38.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1.
212. Robert Mullins, Institutions Have a New Approach to Fair Lending Project: 'Let's Talk',
Bus. J. MAG., Feb. 10, 1992, at 6.
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
nial of credit to low-income neighborhoods 13 According to information
disclosed pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,2 14 Boston was
rejecting black loan applicants 34.9% of the time.215 The study considered
a myriad of factors that might explain the number of mortgages originating
in a particular neighborhood. The study concluded that two major factors
that lead to a lack of community reinvestment are: (1) discrimination in the
housing market, which restricts the mobility of African Americans and
leads to fewer lending transactions, and (2) lending discrimination, which
deters African Americans from applying for a loan because of the percep-
tion that they will be rejected.21 6 The study also concluded that:
From the available data it is not possible to sort out the precise role
played by lenders, as opposed to buyers, sellers, developers, realtors,
appraisers, insurers and others, in the complex housing and mort-
gage markets. What is indisputable is that the ratio of mortgage
loans to housing varies by race and this pattern cannot be fully ex-
plained by economic and other non-racial factors.217
B. Criticisms of the CRA Examination Proceess
The 1989 amendment to the CRA that mandated public disclosure of
CRA ratings21 8 has resulted in increased scrutiny of the regulatory exami-
nations. After hundreds of completed CRA examinations, some critics con-
tend it is obvious that something is wrong because African American
rejection rates remain disproportionately high as compared to those of
whites. Yet, CRA statistics reflect a high level of compliance.21 9 "Statistics
compiled by federal regulators indicate that approximately one out of every
ten banking institutions examined for compliance with the Community Re-
investment Act, since July 1, 1990, needs to improve its performance in
meeting the credit needs of its community. 2 °20 Lenders, who are defending
themselves against allegations of discrimination, point to these statistics to
213. Katharine L. Bradbury et al., Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-
1987, NEw ENG. ECON. Rnv., Sept.-Oct., 1989.
214. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2804(b)(2) (West 1988).
215. See Cooper, supra note 198, at 38.
216. Bradbury et al., supra note 213, at 3.
217. Id. at 4.
218. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
219. Geoff Cooper, Cross-examination: Regulators' Reports at Odds, Bus. J., Nov. 11, 1991,
at 8. The president of the Milwaukee branch of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People agrees with this assessment. Id.; see supra notes 187-217 and accompanying text
for statistical support.
220. Regulators Find CRA Performance Lacking for One Out of 10 Institutions Examined, 57
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 137 (July 22, 1991). The following statistics represent the results
of the various federal supervisory agencies' CRA examinations.
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strengthen their contention that they are meeting the needs of their commu-
nities in accordance with the CRA.zz l CRA proponents point to the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act statistics, 222 which conflict sharply with the posi-
tive tone that regulatory examinations have established. The net result is a
fundamental questioning of the entire CRA process.
The CRA examination process has been criticized because of the em-
phasis on documentation of a lender's activities. Compounding the criti-
cism is the fact that documentation alone is not necessarily an accurate
measure of an institution's efforts to comply with the CRA.223 Smaller
community bankers, in particular, are upset with the growing cost of regu-
latory compliance.22 4 Smaller bankers contend that everything they do is
CRA-related and, thus, they are required to keep track of everything.22 To
alleviate this regulatory burden, community bankers suggest that the CRA
should exempt banks with less than $150 million in assets and exclude
towns with fewer than 5,000 residents. 226 However, since these institutions
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
(501 thrifts)
84-Needs-to-improve (17%)
19-Substantial non-compliance (3%)
374-Satisfactory (75%)
24-Outstanding (5%)
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
(477 national banks)
63-Needs-to-improve (13%)
4-Substantial non-compliance (1%)
357-Satisfactory (75%)
53-Outstanding (11%)
Id. The breakdown of lending institutions' CRA
follows:
Wisconsin
(127 institutions rated)
Federal Reserve
(522 state-chartered member banks)
49-Needs-to-improve (8.9%)
5-Substantial non-compliance (<1%)
445-Satisfactory (80.6%)
53-Outstanding (9.6%)
Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp. (FDIC)
(2,162 state-chartered non-member banks)
201-Needs-to-improve (9%)
9-Substantial non-compliance (1%)
1,813-Satisfactory (84%)
139-Outstanding (6%)
ratings in Wisconsin and in Milwaukee are as
Milwaukee
(14 institutions rated)
2-Needs to improve (1.6%) 12-Satisfactory (85.7%)
98-Satisfactory (77.1%) 2-Outstanding (14.3%)
27-Outstanding (21.3%)
Cooper, supra note 219, at 8.
221. Regulators Find CRA Performance Lacking for One Out of 10 Institutions Examined,
supra note 220, at 137.
222. See supra notes 187-217 and accompanying text.
223. See Regulators Find CRA Performance Lacking for One Out of 10 Institutions Ex-
amined, supra note 220, at 137.
224. Debra Cope, Community Bankers Feel Swamped by the Rising Tide of Regulations, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 25, 1992, at 1.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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contend that all of their business is CRA-related, they should have no
trouble complying with regulatory guidelines.
Rather than exempt smaller lenders from CRA requirements, these
lenders should focus on more cost-effective methods to track their CRA
activities. CRA requirements should apply to all federally or state-
chartered lenders because discriminatory lending practices should not be
precluded simply because of an institution's size or location.
C. Encouraging Lenders to Meet Community Lending Needs
Governments at the community, state, and federal levels are large cus-
tomers of various financial institutions regulated under the CRA. It has
been suggested that these governmental entities develop a linked deposit
program. This program envisions that governmental agencies establish cri-
teria that incorporate a financial institution's lending commitment to
targeted CRA areas in deciding where to deposit public funds.227 A linked
deposit program will "encourage" lenders to critically assess their CRA ob-
ligation so that they may compete for government agencies' deposits.
Another method to encourage lenders to meet their CRA obligations is
to permit civil actions for court review of a supervisory agency's decision
approving a financial institution's merger application and to allow recovery
for harm caused by such an approval. In Kaimowitz v. Board of Gover-
nors,228 the Eleventh Circuit dismissed an attorney's pro se petition for
court review of a Federal Reserve Board of Governor's decision to approve
a bank merger. Because the petitioner failed to establish that he suffered
personal injury, the constitutional standing requirement was not met and
the court dismissed his petition.229
In dicta discussing the weaknesses of the petitioner's case, the court may
have opened a potential cause of action for a successful challenge of a finan-
cial supervisory institution's merger approval. The court stated that a chal-
lenge to a Federal Reserve Board's decision requires: (1) participation in the
administrative proceedings, and (2) direct and personal injury.23° The peti-tioner participated in the administrative proceeding challenging approval of
227. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 200, at 18.
228. 940 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
229. Id. at 611. A Florida attorney, who represented a number of minority-owned busi-
nesses, protested First Union Corporation's acquisition of Florida National Banks of Florida, Inc.
for failing to meet its obligations under the CRA. Relying on the First Union's promises to imple-
ment programs addressing CRA concerns, the Federal Reserve Board approved the acquisition
despite the attorney's protests alleging that First Union misrepresented its CRA commitment. Id.
230. Id. at 613.
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the merger, but failed to establish that he was personally injured. The court
stated:
We note that petitioner has not alleged any other personal injury, for
example, that he is a member of the class of citizens that CRA seeks
to benefit; that he is a member of a minority or low- or moderate-
income group that might benefit from First Union's improved CRA
performance; that he resides in a minority or low- or moderate-in-
come census tract that might benefit under the CRA; or that he has
sought or is likely to seek credit from a bank owned by First Union
or Florida National.231
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit defined a class of individuals who have
standing to challenge a Federal Reserve Board's approval based on the
CRA. To date, there has not been a court reversal of an institution's ap-
proved application for merger for lack of CRA performance.
Although standing is a prerequisite to bringing an action to reverse a
supervisory agency's decision, proof that a lender is failing to comply with
the CRA after an application for merger has been approved appears to be
even more difficult. In Washington v. Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency,2" 2 the plaintiff sought reversal of the decision approving the merger
of First Union Bank of Savannah and First Union National Bank of Geor-
gia. The plaintiffs opposed the merger based on inadequate CRA perform-
ance. The court in rejecting this opposition because of poor documentation
stated:
SCRA did submit data documenting a wide discrepancy between the
amount of First Savannah's lending which is directed toward afflu-
ent neighborhoods and the amount of First Savannah's lending
which is directed toward low-income, minority neighborhoods. The
Community Reinvestment Act was not intended to, and could not
possibly, equalize lending to the affluent and to the poor. The Act
merely requires the OCC to "encourage" banks to meet the credit
needs of low and moderate income neighborhoods, "consistent with
the safe and sound operation of such [banks]." 2 '
While the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in reversing the OCC's decision
because of insufficient documentation, the possibility remains that courts
may accept more sophisticated illustrations of a lender's failure to comply
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Washington v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. CV487-281, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11474 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1988).
233. Id. at * 11 n.3 (citation omitted). Savannah Community Reinvestment Alliance (SCRA)
is a community based organization and was a named plaintiff in this action. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) was also a named plaintiff in this action.
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with the CRA. The mortgage gap statistics presented in this Comment, 234
which are the results of recent data, may lead the way for future community
protests to use the CRA as a sword to check supervisory agencies. Addi-
tionally, the Federal Reserve has promised to use the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act data as an additional tool to assess a lender's CRA
performance.235
The savings and loan debacle combined with the precarious financial
position of many banks has created an environment in which lenders have a
heightened interest in avoiding the costs and bad publicity associated with a
CRA protest. Consequently, lenders have discovered the benefits of com-
plying with the CRA and many have taken affirmative measures to identify
and address community needs before community groups confront them and
they are forced to defend their lending practices.236
VIII. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the CRA has influenced the banking industry and has
sparked a heightened awareness of a financial institution's role in the com-
munity and the corresponding obligation to serve the needs of low and
moderate income neighborhoods. Increased public and regulatory scrutiny
of financial institutions has created a unique opportunity for community
groups to be heard. Successful CRA challenges to regulatory approval of
mergers will provide lenders an incentive to address the needs of the com-
munities they serve. Through this remedy, communities can motivate lend-
ers to begin making up for their neglect while convincing others that their
community is a worthwhile investment. Although some critics contend
that the CRA is a "paper tiger," its presence in the regulatory scheme has
undeniably encouraged lenders to address and invest in their communities.
DAVID EVAN COHEN*
234. See supra notes 187-217 and accompanying text.
235. See Cooper, supra note 219, at 8.
236. See supra notes 138-171 and accompanying text.
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